CFA: “Moral Motivation: Evidence and Relevance” Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, 18-20 May 2012

Posted: 5 de December de 2011 by Fernando Furtado in Call for Papers, Event

Call for abstracts:


Gothenburg, Sweden, May 18-20 2012

Deadline: January 20, 2012 (see below for instructions)

INVITED SPEAKERS (abstracts here:

James Dreier, Brown University
– Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?
Jeanette Kennett, Macquarie University
– Moral Motivation and Its Impairments: Empirical and Philosophical
Jesse Prinz, CUNY
– An Empirical Case for Emotionally Based Internalism
Michael Ridge, University of Edinburgh
– Internalism: Cui Bono?
Michael Smith, Princeton University
– Moral Judgements, Judgements about Reasons, and Motivations
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Ohio State University
– Detecting Value with Motivational Responses
Jon Tresan, UNC Chapel Hill
– Objective Moral Realism & The Role-Individuation of Moral Judgments
Nick Zangwill, Durham University
– Essence, Agent-Causation and Motivational Externalism

The relation between moral judgments and moral motivation is a central
issue in ethical theory.
According to motivational internalism, making a moral judgment implies
being motivated to act
accordingly, at least under normal circumstances. The truth of
motivational internalism is highly
contested (motivational externalists reject it), and often taken to
have implications for the nature of
moral emotions and moral judgments, the meaning of normative terms,
and the possibility of
objective truth and knowledge in morality.

During the last two decades, various new forms of motivational
internalism have raised questions
both about possible sources of evidence for and against these forms,
and about the metaethical
relevance of a defensible internalism. Some forms seem to be
straightforward empirical claims,
making traditional a priori arguments for or against internalism
suspect; other forms make it unclear
how internalism would favor moral anti-realism over realism. (For an
overview of recent work on
motivational internalism, see

The conference Moral Motivation: Evidence and Relevance will bring
together senior and junior
scholars working on both issues of evidence and issues of relevance.

Abstracts of up to 1 000 words should be submitted no later than
January 20, 2012, to Gunnar
Björnsson, gunnar dot bjornsson at gu dot se. Notifications of
acceptance can be expected before the end of

Selected papers from the conference will be published in a conference
volume. Please indicate
willingness to contribute to such a volume and have a final version of
a manuscript ready by August

MMER is a research project focusing on philosophical issues regarding
moral motivation. We are
investigating the conceptual and empirical connections between moral
opinions and moral
motivation, and their implications for moral semantics, moral
psychology and the objectivity of
morality. The project runs from 2010 to 2012 and is based at the
University of Gothenburg. MMER is
financed by the Swedish Research Council and the Department of
Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory
of Science. For more information, see


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